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Between Labor Disputes and 
Employee Performance 
Alexandre Mas 
Industrial relations events such as strikes, slowdowns, 
or work stoppages can have important economic 
consequences for films. These episodes may impact firm-
level measures of productivity and output, especially if 
workers refrain from producing. In cases where output 
is contractible, adverse conditions of employment may 
induce workers to lower effort in other dimensions of 
production, for example, through diminishing the quality 
of the product. However, a relationship between worker 
treatment and the quality of production has proved 
difficult to establish. Since quality is often unobserved 
or hard to measure, little is known about the impact of 
adverse labor relations on workers' efforts when they 
are on the job and even producing at full capacity. This 
dissertation sheds light on the question of how conditions 
of employment affect the performance of workers by 
exploring two natural experiments that allow for direct 
tests of the effect of labor disputes on product quality. 
In addition, I present evidence from arbitration systems 
demonstrating that the precise characteristics of wage 
settlements can have important implications for the 
performance of workers. 
Chapter 1 examines the construction equipment resale 
market and assesses the impact of contract disputes 
on Caterpillar, the world's largest manufacturer of 
construction machinely. Chapter 2, which is coauthored 
with Alan Krueger, explores whether a long, contentious 
strike and the hiring of replacement workers at 
BridgestonelFirestone's Decatur plant in the mid 1990s 
contributed to the production of defective tires. In 
Chapter 3 I construct a matched dataset of arbitration 
cases involving compensation of police in New Jersey 
and monthly arrest rates at the municipality level to test 
whether arrest rates depend on the arbitration outcome, 
the arbitrator award, and, crucially, the expected outcome. 
The unifying theme of this dissertation is that industrial 
relations, particularly wage policy, requires careful 
accounting of employee effort. The three studies show 
that the extent to which workers choose to exert effort 
on the job can have economically important implications 
for firms, consumers, and even public safety. The effects 
are large, economically significant, and provide insight 
into possible avenues through which policymalcers and 
managers can mitigate these hidden costs of disputes. 
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Chapter 1: Labor Unrest and the Quality of 
Production- Evidence from the Construction 
Equipment Resale Market 
In the first chapter I examine the construction 
equipment resale market in order to assess whether 
equipment produced by the world's largest manufacturer 
of construction machinery, Caterpillar, experienced 
lower product quality in several facilities where workers 
underwent extended contract disputes during the 1990s. 
Since the physical quality of construction machinery is 
inherently difficult to measure, I rely on resale market 
outcomes to infer whether machines produced during 
the dispute were of inferior quality. An analysis of 
transaction-level data from auctions occurring between 
1994 and 2002 reveals that resale market participants 
significantly discounted machines produced in these 
facilities during the dispute, by about 4 percent. Because 
in any given year of production identical models of 
equipment were produced in plants both affected and 
unaffected by the dispute, the statistical model employed 
in this paper is able to address numerous confounding 
factors since I can essentially "hold constant" factors 
that affected the resale prices of a cohort of models in a 
given calendar year. I also find that pieces of equipment 
produced in facilities experiencing labor unrest were 
resold more often in the auction market, received lower 
reports by independent construction equipment appraisers, 
and had lower list prices in the new market relative to 
other comparable equipment. Finally, I also present 
evidence that resale market participants learned over 
time about the change in quality corresponding to this 
cohort of construction equipment, suggesting the presence 
of additional inefficiencies resulting from goods being 
misallocated to consumers. Taken together, the evidence 
supports the hypothesis that workmanship at dispute-
affected facilities declined. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Caterpillar Dispute 
The results from this paper allow for a cost-benefit 
analysis of the labor dispute from management's 
perspective, since the focus of the analysis is on prices. 
On balance, the analysis suggests that the equipment 
produced in facilities undergoing labor disputes was 
discounted by the resale market by about 4 percent. 
I outline a model of the durable goods resale market 
that predicts that the change in resale price for dispute-
affected equipment relative to the comparison group 
can be interpreted as the change in the discounted 
stream of service flows~economic quality. Based on 
this theoretical prediction, the analysis suggests that 
equipment produced during the dispute experienced 
almost a quarter of a billion dollars in lost service flows 
due to price depreciation alone. 
An important question to consider is whether any 
ofthese large losses in service flows were internalized 
by Caterpillar, or equivalently, whether prices for 
new equipment were also discounted, so as to affect 
Caterpillar's revenue, and to what extent these prices 
were discounted relative to resale prices. The model of 
the durable goods market presented in the paper predicts 
that when equipment experiences increased physical 
depreciation, it may also experience increased price 
depreciation, suggesting that the effect of the labor 
dispute on resale prices may not have fully shifted to 
Caterpillar revenues. l 
One approach to estimating the cost of the dispute 
due to lower product quality is to assign an upper bound 
on the effect of lower quality equipment on Caterpillar 
revenues. Suppose that increased physical depreciation 
of older equipment was fully capitalized in new prices. 
The dispute would have led to a $240 million reduction 
in Caterpillar revenue arising from the labor dispute. 
Of interest is how this reduction in revenue compares 
to labor cost savings brought about by Caterpillar's 
decision to demand concessions from the United Auto 
Workers (UAW). This comparison is possible since the 
counterfactuallabor contract is known-the contract 
Deere signed with the UAW in 1991. Prior to 1991, 
bargaining in the construction equipment industry was 
characterized by pattern bargaining, by which the UAW 
would sign a contract with one company in the industry 
and others would follow suit. In 1991 the target company 
for negotiations was Deere, and a settlement resulted. 
According to industry analysts at the time of the strike, 
the contract signed with Deere would have increased 
labor costs at Caterpillar by about $250 million over 
the life of the three year contract (Kelly 1992). Over 
the entire six-plus years of the dispute, the difference 
in wage bills between Caterpillar and Deere was on the 
order of$500 million, since in 1995 Deere signed a new 
contract with the UAW that extended the base wages 
set in the previous contract (Daily Labor Report 1995). 
Assuming that the only costs of the strike were due to 
quality reductions, and that new prices fully capitalized 
future quality depreciation of dispute-affected equipment, 
then the loss in revenue resulting from inferior equipment 
produced during the dispute was about half as large as 
the labor cost savings over the dispute period, provided 
that Caterpillar reverted back to the Deere contract after 
six years. If Caterpillar did not revert back to the Deere 
settlement after six years, then the net present value of 
breaking from pattern would be on the order of $1.4 
billon, clearly outweighing the costs associated with the 
quality reductions alone. However, under this assumption, 
the results of the paper show that the hidden costs of the 
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dispute, due to the quality reductions, are approximately 
16 percent of total labor cost savings, which is quite a 
sizable quantity, especially when one considers that this 
estimate does not take into account the direct costs of the 
strike as well as reputation costs Caterpillar may have 
incurred. 
Chapter 2: Strikes, Scabs, and Tread 
Separations-Labor Strife and the Production of 
Defective BridgestoneiFirestone Tires 
The second chapter, which is written jointly with 
Alan Krueger, is a second case study of the effect of 
labor relations on product quality. We consider whether 
a long, contentious strike and the hiring of permanent 
replacement workers by BridgestonelFirestone in the 
mid 1990s contributed to the production of defective 
tires, which received substantial media attention in the 
early 2000s. Using several independent data sources, 
we find that labor strife in the Decatur, Illinois plant 
closely coincided with lower product quality. Count data 
regression models based on two data sets of tire failures 
by plant, year, and age show significantly higher failure 
rates for tires produced in Decatur during the labor 
dispute than before or after the dispute, or than at other 
plants. Also, an analysis of internal Firestone engineering 
tests indicates that type-P23 5 tires from Decatur 
performed worse if they were manufactured during the 
labor dispute compared with those produced after the 
dispute, or compared with those from other, nonstriking 
plants. 
Consumer Safety and Policy Implications of the 
Bridgestone/Firestone Case 
While in the Caterpillar case the reductions in product 
quality had significant economic effects, the Bridgestonel 
Firestone case had additional implications on consumer 
safety. The results in this chapter suggest that about 46 
lives were lost because of the excessive number of defects 
occurring in P23 5 tires manufactured in the Decatur 
plant at the time of the labor dispute. These results have 
consequential implications for policymakers. We estimate 
that in the absence of the tire recall there would have 
been 249 additional fatalities. This estimate makes clear 
the importance of government, in this case the National 
Highway and Transportation Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), monitoring. Additional deaths may have 
been avoided had there been increased monitoring of the 
tires produced in plants undergoing labor disputes. Less 
encouraging are the results from the high-speed stress 
tests. These tests show that tires produced at Decatur 
during the dispute were less resistant to wear than tires 
produced at the Joliette and Wilson plants, or tires 
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produced at other times. Nevertheless, even the defective 
cohort of tires were above the threshold established by 
the Society of Automotive engineers for the test analyzed 
in the paper. In light of this finding, existing thresholds 
should be reevaluated and set to ensure minimal failure 
rates on the roads. 
A question that is explored in the paper is whether 
Bridgestone/Firestone should have detected a break in 
the defect rate prior to the NHTSA investigation. In this 
chapter we ask when Bridgestone/Firestone should have 
detected a problem with Decatur produced tires had they 
been specifically monitoring the this facility in light of 
the dispute. We estimate that by 1996 there were already 
a statistically significant number of excessive claims 
originating from the Decatur plant at the time ofthe 
dispute relative to other plants and the years prior to the 
dispute. Had BridgestonelFirestone initiated a recall in 
1996, and reduced the defect rate of tires produced in the 
Decatur plant to predispute levels, we estimate that 38 
deaths could have been averted. 
Implication of the BridgestonelFirestone and 
Caterpillar Cases for the Debate over Amending 
the National Labor Relations Act 
Chapters 1 and 2 are pertinent to the debate for 
legislation on whether the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA) should be amended to prohibit employers 
from hiring permanent replacement workers during a 
strike.2 The data on Bridgestone/Firestone tire consumer 
complaints and claims to the manufacturer provide a 
unique opportunity to investigate tire defect rates at 
relatively high frequencies. Detailed comparisons can be 
made between defect rates and the precise composition 
ofthe workforce at the Decatur plant during the period 
of labor unrest. Monthly data suggest that the production 
of defective tires was particularly high in early 1994, 
around the time when wage concessions were demanded 
by Firestone, and in late 1995 and early 1996, when large 
numbers of replacement workers and permanent workers 
worked side by side. These results accord with the pattern 
of resale prices for Caterpillar equipment affected by the 
labor dispute. Decomposing the resale price discount on 
Caterpillar construction equipment produced during the 
labor dispute by each individual year of production shows 
that this discount was most pronounced for equipment 
made after striking workers had returned to work, but 
before they had signed a new contract with Caterpillar. 
Therefore, both cases provide evidence that changes 
in product quality cannot be attributed solely to an 
inexperienced replacement workforce. The results suggest 
that whether replacement workers are building dangerous 
products due to inexperience or lack of training should 
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not be the central focus in the debate over legislation that 
seeks to amend the NLRA. 
Chapter 3: Do Disappointing Pay Raises Lower 
Productivity? Final-Offer Arbitration and the 
Performance of New Jersey Police Officers 
While much of our understanding of labor markets 
derives from the idea that workers respond to incentives, 
an emerging body of experimental work provides 
evidence that psychological or nonmarket factors are 
also important determinants of employee performance 
(Fehr and Gachter 2000). Surveys of employers suggest 
that deviations from reference wages impact worker 
morale and that managers are reluctant to lower wages 
(Bewley 1999,2002; Blinder and Choi 1990; Kaufman 
1984; Agell and Lundborg 1999). While the theoretical 
literature on gift exchange has emphasized the role of 
social norms in determining worker performance, there 
is little understanding of the determinants of reference 
points and how workers perceive and act on surprises and 
disappointments in the workplace (Koszegi and Rabin 
2004). Moreover, as Verhoogen, Burks, and Carpenter 
(2003) note, while the proposition that productivity 
declines when wages deviate from a reference point is 
commonly used by economists to explain such empirical 
regularities as wage rigidities, involuntary unemployment, 
and interindustry wage differentials within occupational 
categories, evidence from real labor markets of this 
proposition is limited. 
The goal of this paper is to empirically assess 
the relationship between relative wages and worker 
performance in a real labor market, as well as to explore 
the mechanism through which this relationship could 
operate. It is a challenge to empirically identify the 
causal effect of wage growth on performance due to the 
scarcity of instances where a variation in compensation 
is plausibly uncorrelated to changes in productivity. 
Testing whether performance is affected by deviation 
of wages fi'om reference points is further complicated 
by the lack of guidance from the theoretical literature 
on the characteristics of the comparison wage. I argue 
in this paper that arbitration systems offer an attractive 
real-world laboratory to investigate how on-the-job 
performance of labor market participants responds 
causally to changes in compensation. 
The use of arbitration as a dispute resolution procedure 
is prevalent in the public sector and is becoming 
increasingly important in the private sector following the 
U.S. Supreme COlllt's ruling in 2001 that employees can 
be required to submit all employment disputes to binding 
arbitration. A commonly used arbitration procedure to 
resolve contract disputes is final-offer arbitration (FOA), 
in which disputing parties submit offers to an arbitrator 
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who is constrained to choose one of the disputant's 
offers in a binding settlement. As described in the next 
section, while the decision to engage in arbitration may 
be cotTelated with a variety municipal finance and labor 
market conditions, economic theory, as applied to FOA, 
suggests that there is a random component to arbitration 
rulings, and when disputing parties submit Nash 
equilibrium offers, the arbitrator's ruling is random and 
orthogonal to the facts of the case. Moreover, information 
drawn from arbitration cases includes both the wage that 
is enacted as well as the counteroffer, information that 
allows for a unique perspective on the role of reference 
points on employee outcomes. 
I employ a dataset containing information on FAO 
cases involving compensation disputes between New 
Jersey Police Bargaining Units (PBUs) and municipalities 
between 1978 and 1996. These data are matched to data 
on monthly municipal atTest rates. Using the resulting 
dataset, I test whether arrest rates are different in the 
months following arbitration in municipalities where 
the arbitrator ruled in favor of the PBU to municipalities 
where the arbitrator ruled against the PBU. This paper 
provides evidence that a tangible effect of arbitration is 
discerned through recognizing postarbitration disparities 
in atTest rates, depending on the arbitrator's ruling. 
Specifically, I estimate that per-capita arrests were 10 
percent higher in the months following arbitration when 
arbitrators ruled in favor ofPBUs relative to when 
arbitrators ruled in favor of the municipal employer. I 
provide additional evidence that the disparities in atTests 
are not the result of changing crime rates or employment 
levels in police departments following arbitration. 
An attractive feature of the dataset is that information 
is available on the final offers ofthe parties in dispute. 
Using this information, it is possible to examine the 
determinants of arrest rate differentials due to differing 
arbitration rulings. The degree to which an arbitration 
decision is considered a win or a loss may depend on 
expectations upon entering arbitration. A growing number 
oflaboratory experiments provide evidence that subjects 
behave as if they have reference-dependent preferences 
(Bateman et al. 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; 
Thaler 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Consider, 
for example, the following lottery: a person can win 
$32 with probability 0.8 or lose $8 with probability 0.2. 
Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov (1999) find that losing $8 
in this lottery is less painful to participants than losing $8 
in a lottery where the alternative is a loss of $32. These 
results suggest that preferences depend not only on actual 
outcomes, but also what could have occurred in a different 
state of the world. 
What are the implications of surprise and 
disappointment for workers in the labor market? The 
natural experiments considered in this paper can be 
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motivated by the following simple example which is 
similar in spirit to the experiments described in Mellers, 
Schwartz, and Ritov (1999). Suppose that a worker's raise 
depends on the outcome of a lottery. With probability p 
she will receive a 6 percent raise in the following year and 
with probability (1 - p) she will receive a 2 percent raise. 
How does the outcome ofthis lottery affect the worker's 
productivity? In particular, is the worker's productivity 
lower if she receives the 2 percent raise relative to the 
case in which she receives the 6 percent raise? Does the 
productivity effect of obtaining the 6 percent raise depend 
on the magnitude of the alternative point on the lottery's 
support, or some other reference point? Lastly, how does 
the value of p, or the probability of the larger raise, affect 
her productivity following either a win or a loss? 
The results of the paper show that the postarbitration 
atTest rate differential between cities in which the 
arbitrator ruled in favor of the PBU and in cities in which 
he ruled against the PBU is not growing in the arbitrator 
award, suggesting that a simple effort/wage gradient is not 
accounting for the postarbitration relationships observed 
in the data. Conditional on the arbitrator award, however, 
the postarbitration productivity differentials are increasing 
in the spread of the final offers, a result that accords with 
models of disappointment aversion: the performance of 
police officers following a raise depends not only on the 
quantity of the raise, but on the alternative raise as well. I 
also provide evidence that the decline in arrests following 
a police arbitration loss is increasing in the difference 
between the expected award and the arbitrator award, 
suggesting that postarbitration changes in arrests are most 
serious when the ruling is considered a relative surprise. 
The results fi'om this paper are powerful as they 
suggest a framework that can be extended in a number 
of directions to answer a variety of questions that are 
of interest to municipal government, policymakers, 
and managers. For example, I am currently using 
this framework to study the causal effect of police 
performance on crime, an important question that 
is ultimately difficult to address in a credible way. 
Arbitration rulings affect arrest rates in the months after 
arbitration through, presumably, changes in policing 
tactics. Assuming that criminals do not also respond to 
arbitration rulings other than through, perhaps, changes 
in policing patterns, one can test whether crime rates also 
respond to arbitration rulings and therefore obtain causal 
estimates of the effect of policing on criminal activity. 
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Notes 
1. Indeed, I find that models of new equipment that were 
uniformly produced in dispute-affected facilities were 
assigned by Caterpillar approximately 2 percent lower list 
prices than models that were uniformly produced in facilities 
that were not subject to dispute, an amount that is relatively 
modest as compared to the degree of discounting in the resale 
market, but consistent with the theory. However, one may 
want use caution in interpreting estimates derived from list 
prices since list prices do not capture discounts Caterpillar 
may have given on equipment at the point of sale. 
2. In June 15, 1993, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 
239-190 to amend the National Labor Relations Act. The bill 
never reached the Senate due to a threatened filibuster. 
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